Top 100 Scholarly Articles for PhD Dissertation

Dissertation Title: “From Lowest Price to Highest Public Value: An Empirical Test of Best-Value Source Selection in Government RFPs”

University of Denver

Compiled: February 2026

Table of Contents

1. Source Selection: Best-Value vs. LPTA
2. Public Value Theory
3. Transaction Cost Economics
4. Auction Theory & Mechanism Design
5. Procurement Economics & Contract Theory
6. Bid Protests & Procurement Delay
7. Solicitation Quality & Requirements
8. Oversight, Red Tape & Bureaucracy
9. Strategic Bidding & Renegotiation
10. Incumbency & Competition
11. Value for Money Frameworks
12. Procurement Reform & Modernization
13. Research Methods

1. Source Selection: Best-Value vs. LPTA

Article 1

Congressional Research Service. (2024). Defense primer: Lowest price technically acceptable contracts (IF10968). Washington, DC: CRS.

Relevance: Updated CRS primer outlining statutory restrictions on LPTA use enacted through successive NDAAs (FY2017–FY2019), including prohibitions on LPTA for cybersecurity, protective equipment, and knowledge-based services. Essential policy reference. Approximate citations: N/A (government report).

Article 2

U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2018). Defense contracting: DOD’s use of lowest price technically acceptable source selection procedures to acquire selected services (GAO-18-139). Washington, DC: GAO.

Relevance: Follow-up GAO study documenting Congressional concern over DoD’s overuse of LPTA for knowledge-based professional services, personal protective equipment, and contingency logistics. Establishes the policy context for NDAA restrictions on LPTA. Approximate citations: ~20.

Article 3

Hawkins, T. G., Landale, K., & Rendon, R. G. (2017). Examining the effects of source selection method on procurement outcomes. Journal of Defense Analytics and Logistics, 1(1), 47–68.

Relevance: The most directly relevant empirical study to the dissertation. Uses 124 archival DoD contract records to show that the tradeoff (best-value) source selection method increases procurement lead time but produces significantly better supplier performance compared to LPTA. Approximate citations: ~45.

Article 4

U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2014). Defense contracting: Factors DOD considers when choosing best value processes are consistent with guidance for selected acquisitions (GAO-14-584). Washington, DC: GAO.

Relevance: Major GAO audit examining DoD’s use of tradeoff versus LPTA source selection for 2,851 competitively awarded contracts in FY 2013, finding increased LPTA usage for higher-obligation contracts since 2010. Provides the empirical landscape for understanding source selection trends. Approximate citations: ~30.

Article 5

Decarolis, F. (2014). Awarding price, contract performance, and bids screening: Evidence from procurement auctions. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 6(1), 108–132.

Relevance: Demonstrates the perverse tradeoff in first-price (lowest-price) auctions between low awarding prices and poor ex post performance. Finds that at least half of cost savings from low winning prices are lost to renegotiation, directly supporting the case against LPTA. Approximate citations: ~260.

Article 6

Tadelis, S. (2012). Public procurement design: Lessons from the private sector. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 30(3), 297–302.

Relevance: Framework arguing that simple projects should use fixed-price contracts with competitive bidding, while complex projects benefit from cost-plus contracts awarded through negotiation. Provides the theoretical rationale for matching source selection method to procurement complexity. Approximate citations: ~290.

Article 7

Hawkins, T. G., Gravier, M. J., & Powley, E. H. (2011). Public versus private sector procurement ethics and strategy: What each sector can learn from the other. Journal of Business Ethics, 103(4), 567–586.

Relevance: Empirical comparison of procurement ethics and strategy across 328 procurement professionals in public and private sectors. Finds that public sector leaders are more likely to tolerate opportunistic behavior, informing understanding of source selection integrity. Approximate citations: ~190.

Article 8

Rendon, R. G. (2008). Procurement process maturity: Key to performance measurement. Journal of Public Procurement, 8(2), 200–214.

Relevance: Introduces the Contract Management Maturity Model (CMMM) for assessing DoD procurement process capability across five maturity levels. Provides a framework for understanding how organizational procurement maturity affects source selection outcomes. Approximate citations: ~180.

2. Public Value Theory

Article 9

Patrucco, A. S., Dimand, A., Neshkova, M., & Ceballos, M. (2023). How can procurement create (sustainable) public value under the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal? Public Administration Review, 83(3), 523–539.

Relevance: Most recent major study linking procurement practice to public value creation. Proposes restructuring procurement systems around collaboration, training, flexibility, and sustainability to enhance government contract capacity. Directly connects procurement design to public value outcomes. Approximate citations: ~40.

Article 10

Moore, M. H. (2014). Public value accounting: Establishing the philosophical basis. Public Administration Review, 74(4), 465–477.

Relevance: Extends the public value framework by developing philosophical claims for public value accounting: collectively defined values as the arbiter of value, government authority as a collective asset, and reliance on both utilitarian and deontological frameworks. Essential for operationalizing public value. Approximate citations: ~400.

Article 11

Bryson, J. M., Crosby, B. C., & Bloomberg, L. (2014). Public value governance: Moving beyond traditional public administration and the new public management. Public Administration Review, 74(4), 445–456.

Relevance: Articulates the emerging public value governance paradigm that moves beyond New Public Management, emphasizing democratic values and multi-sector collaboration. Provides the governance context for understanding procurement as a public value creation mechanism. Approximate citations: ~1,250.

Article 12

Benington, J., & Moore, M. H. (Eds.). (2011). Public value: Theory and practice. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Relevance: Provides a comprehensive restatement of public value theory with international applications, assessing its impact during a period of austerity. Includes chapters on co-production, innovation, and deliberative democracy relevant to procurement contexts. Approximate citations: ~900.

Article 13

Benington, J. (2011). From private choice to public value. In J. Benington & M. H. Moore (Eds.), Public value: Theory and practice (pp. 31–51). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Relevance: Distinguishes between public value as “what the public values” and “what adds value to the public sphere,” arguing for a broader conception that moves beyond individual consumer preferences to collective democratic judgments. Approximate citations: ~450.

Article 14

Alford, J., & O’Flynn, J. (2009). Making sense of public value: Concepts, critiques and emergent meanings. International Journal of Public Administration, 32(3–4), 171–207.

Relevance: Provides a critical review of the multiple definitions and interpretations of public value, helping to clarify conceptual boundaries for empirical research. Essential for operationalizing public value in the procurement context. Approximate citations: ~650.

Article 15

Stoker, G. (2006). Public value management: A new narrative for networked governance? American Review of Public Administration, 36(1), 41–57.

Relevance: Argues that public value management is the paradigm best suited to networked governance, based on dialogue and relationships rather than solely rules or incentives. Provides theoretical justification for best-value procurement over rigid lowest-price rules. Approximate citations: ~1,235.

Article 16

Moore, M. H. (1995). Creating public value: Strategic management in government. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Relevance: The foundational text for public value theory. Argues that public managers should aim to create public value through the strategic triangle of substantive value, legitimacy/support, and operational capacity. Core theoretical framework for the dissertation. Approximate citations: ~8,500.

3. Transaction Cost Economics

Article 17

Bajari, P., McMillan, R., & Tadelis, S. (2009). Auctions versus negotiations in procurement: An empirical analysis. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 25(2), 372–399.

Relevance: First empirical study comparing auctions and negotiations in procurement using private nonresidential construction data. Finds that auctions perform poorly when projects are complex, contractual design is incomplete, and few bidders exist. Directly relevant to understanding when LPTA fails. Approximate citations: ~470.

Article 18

Williamson, O. E. (2008). Outsourcing: Transaction cost economics and supply chain management. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 44(2), 5–16.

Relevance: Applies TCE to supply chain and outsourcing decisions, discussing how asset specificity and contractual hazards affect sourcing choices. Bridges TCE theory to practical procurement decision-making. Approximate citations: ~570.

Article 19

Brown, T. L., & Potoski, M. (2003). Transaction costs and institutional explanations for government service production decisions. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 13(4), 441–468.

Relevance: Applies TCE to government make-or-buy decisions using data from U.S. cities, finding that asset specificity and measurement difficulty drive production choices. Demonstrates TCE’s applicability to public procurement decisions. Approximate citations: ~800.

Article 20

Bajari, P., & Tadelis, S. (2001). Incentives versus transaction costs: A theory of procurement contracts. RAND Journal of Economics, 32(3), 387–407.

Relevance: Develops a model showing that fixed-price contracts provide good ex ante cost incentives but impose high renegotiation frictions, while cost-plus contracts accommodate adaptation but weaken incentives. Directly explains the theoretical tradeoff between LPTA and best-value approaches. Approximate citations: ~1,100.

Article 21

Rindfleisch, A., & Heide, J. B. (1997). Transaction cost analysis: Past, present, and future applications. Journal of Marketing, 61(4), 30–54.

Relevance: Comprehensive review of empirical TCE research across multiple domains, identifying methodological best practices and gaps. Provides guidance for applying TCE empirically to procurement source selection research. Approximate citations: ~4,200.

Article 22

Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, relational contracting. New York: Free Press.

Relevance: Comprehensive treatise extending TCE to explain why firms exist and how governance structures align with transaction characteristics. Provides the theoretical foundation for understanding why different procurement mechanisms (competitive bidding vs. negotiation) are optimal for different contexts. Approximate citations: ~48,000.

Article 23

Williamson, O. E. (1979). Transaction-cost economics: The governance of contractual relations. Journal of Law and Economics, 22(2), 233–261.

Relevance: Foundational article establishing the transaction cost economics framework for analyzing governance structures. Introduces the key dimensions of asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency that determine whether transactions should occur through markets, hierarchies, or hybrid forms. Approximate citations: ~5,960.

4. Auction Theory & Mechanism Design

Article 24

Asker, J., & Cantillon, E. (2010). Procurement when price and quality matter. RAND Journal of Economics, 41(1), 1–34.

Relevance: Extends scoring auction analysis to multidimensional type spaces, showing that simple first- and second-score auctions implement the optimal mechanism under certain conditions. Provides complete characterization of equilibrium bidding when quality is contractible. Approximate citations: ~220.

Article 25

Asker, J., & Cantillon, E. (2008). Properties of scoring auctions. RAND Journal of Economics, 39(1), 69–85.

Relevance: Systematic analysis of equilibrium behavior in scoring auctions with multidimensional private information. Shows scoring auctions dominate menu auctions, beauty contests, and price-only auctions with minimum quality thresholds. Provides theoretical support for best-value over LPTA. Approximate citations: ~310.

Article 26

Milgrom, P. (2004). Putting auction theory to work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Relevance: Demonstrates how auction theory can be applied to practical market design problems, including multi-attribute procurement auctions and scoring rules. Shows that scoring auctions can yield higher welfare than price-only auctions. Approximate citations: ~2,200.

Article 27

Klemperer, P. (1999). Auction theory: A guide to the literature. Journal of Economic Surveys, 13(3), 227–286.

Relevance: Comprehensive survey of auction theory literature covering revenue equivalence, optimal auctions, common values, and the winner’s curse. Essential reference for understanding the theoretical underpinnings of competitive procurement. Approximate citations: ~1,636.

Article 28

Branco, F. (1997). The design of multidimensional auctions. RAND Journal of Economics, 28(1), 63–81.

Relevance: Extends Che’s (1993) framework to analyze multidimensional auctions where the buyer can commit to a scoring rule. Demonstrates conditions under which quality distortion occurs and how mechanism design can improve procurement outcomes. Approximate citations: ~350.

Article 29

Bulow, J., & Klemperer, P. (1996). Auctions versus negotiations. American Economic Review, 86(1), 180–194.

Relevance: Proves that a simple auction with N+1 bidders dominates an optimally designed negotiation with N bidders (under independent private values). Demonstrates that competition is more important than mechanism sophistication, informing the value of competitive procurement. Approximate citations: ~1,800.

Article 30

Che, Y.-K. (1993). Design competition through multidimensional auctions. RAND Journal of Economics, 24(4), 668–680.

Relevance: Pioneering model of scoring auctions where firms bid on both price and quality. Shows that optimal scoring rules underweight quality relative to the buyer’s true preferences, and that first- and second-score auctions implement the buyer’s optimum. Directly relevant to best-value scoring mechanisms. Approximate citations: ~950.

Article 31

Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982). A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica, 50(5), 1089–1122.

Relevance: Seminal article developing the general theory of auctions with affiliated values, establishing revenue rankings across auction formats and the linkage principle. Foundation for understanding how information revelation affects procurement outcomes. Approximate citations: ~5,400.

Article 32

Myerson, R. B. (1981). Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6(1), 58–73.

Relevance: Derives the optimal auction for a seller facing bidders with private information, establishing the revenue equivalence theorem. Foundational for understanding mechanism design in procurement contexts. Approximate citations: ~6,500.

5. Procurement Economics & Contract Theory

Article 33

Bajari, P., & Tadelis, S. (2006). Incentives and award procedures: Competitive tendering vs. negotiations in procurement. In N. Dimitri, G. Piga, & G. Spagnolo (Eds.), Handbook of procurement (pp. 121–142). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Relevance: Comprehensive handbook chapter comparing competitive tendering and negotiations, arguing that the choice is bundled with contract type selection. Provides practitioners with guidance on when each approach is optimal. Approximate citations: ~200.

Article 34

Dimitri, N., Piga, G., & Spagnolo, G. (Eds.). (2006). Handbook of procurement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Relevance: Definitive edited volume covering all major aspects of procurement design and management, including auction design, contract theory, corruption, and reform. Essential reference work for procurement research. Approximate citations: ~600.

Article 35

Hart, O., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). The proper scope of government: Theory and an application to prisons. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1127–1161.

Relevance: Applies incomplete contracts theory to government outsourcing decisions, showing that private provision creates incentives to reduce costs at the expense of quality. Directly relevant to understanding quality risks in LPTA procurement. Approximate citations: ~3,400.

Article 36

Manelli, A. M., & Vincent, D. R. (1995). Optimal procurement mechanisms. Econometrica, 63(3), 591–620.

Relevance: Shows that the commonly used auction mechanism is frequently inefficient in procurement environments where sellers have private quality information. Sometimes the optimal mechanism is sequential take-it-or-leave-it offers rather than competitive bidding. Approximate citations: ~230.

Article 37

Laffont, J.-J., & Tirole, J. (1993). A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Relevance: The definitive treatise on principal-agent theory applied to procurement and regulation. Develops optimal contract design for government procurement under asymmetric information, covering cost reimbursement rules, auditing, and multi-period contracting. Approximate citations: ~7,500.

Article 38

Spulber, D. F. (1990). Auctions and contract enforcement. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6(2), 325–344.

Relevance: Demonstrates that when contract enforcement is imperfect and cost overruns can occur, fixed-price contracts awarded through auctions create adverse selection problems. Identifies conditions under which lowest-price procurement mechanisms fail. Approximate citations: ~180.

Article 39

Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1988). Incomplete contracts and renegotiation. Econometrica, 56(4), 755–785.

Relevance: Foundational paper on incomplete contracts theory showing that when contracts cannot specify all contingencies, renegotiation opportunities create severe limitations on feasible contract forms. Directly relevant to understanding why procurement contracts are inherently incomplete. Approximate citations: ~3,200.

Article 40

McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. (1986). Bidding for contracts: A principal-agent analysis. RAND Journal of Economics, 17(3), 326–338.

Relevance: Applies principal-agent theory to procurement bidding, analyzing how the government (principal) should design contracts when contractors (agents) have private cost information. Shows how contract design affects bidding behavior and procurement outcomes. Approximate citations: ~650.

6. Bid Protests & Procurement Delay

Article 41

Kim, D., & Lee, S. (2024). Effects of bid protests against government agencies on firm performance: Role of interorganisational relationship. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 83(1), 112–131.

Relevance: Empirical study using 2001–2019 data finding that sustained protests improve firm performance, with the effect more pronounced when agencies depend more on protesting firms. Demonstrates the strategic implications of bid protests. Approximate citations: ~5.

Article 42

U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2019). Bid protests: GAO bid protest annual report to Congress for fiscal year 2018 (GAO-19-248SP). Washington, DC: GAO.

Relevance: Annual statistical report on GAO bid protest activity, documenting sustain rates, processing timelines, and the effectiveness of recommendations. Provides the empirical baseline for measuring protest-related delays in procurement. Approximate citations: N/A (government report).

Article 43

Schwartz, M., & Manuel, K. M. (2018). GAO bid protests: Trends and analysis (R40227). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

Relevance: Comprehensive CRS analysis of bid protest trends, documenting how protest filings increased 45% from FY2008–2012 even as procurement spending declined. Provides quantitative data on protest prevalence, sustain rates, and processing timelines. Approximate citations: N/A (government report).

Article 44

Gordon, D. I. (2013). Bid protests: The costs are real, but the benefits outweigh them. Public Contract Law Journal, 42(3), 489–516.

Relevance: Argues that the benefits of the bid protest system substantially outweigh costs, countering critics who characterize protests as excessively costly and disruptive. Provides an analytical framework for cost-benefit analysis of procurement accountability mechanisms. Approximate citations: ~45.

Article 45

Schwartz, M. (2013). GAO bid protests: Trends, analysis, and options for Congress (R40227). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

Relevance: Earlier CRS analysis documenting the shift in protest dynamics post-2008, when total government procurement spending decreased by more than 10% while total protests increased by 45%. Provides historical context for protest trends. Approximate citations: N/A (government report).

Article 46

Yukins, C. R. (2012). Feature comment: Bid protests in the U.S. procurement system: Assessing proposed reforms – Part I. The Government Contractor, 54(36), 1–7.

Relevance: Surveys Congressional reform proposals for the bid protest system, assessing whether reforms would reduce risks to competition and uncover management failures. Argues that protests serve as essential accountability mechanisms in procurement. Approximate citations: ~35.

Article 47

Gordon, D. I. (2006). Constructing a bid protest process: Choices every procurement challenge system must make. Public Contract Law Journal, 35(3), 427–445.

Relevance: Former GAO bid protest head analyzes how governments must balance the benefits of bid protests (accountability, competition) against disruptions and delay. Identifies core design elements for effective protest systems. Essential for understanding how source selection method affects protest risk. Approximate citations: ~90.

7. Solicitation Quality & Requirements

Article 48

Rendon, R. G., & Snider, K. F. (2019). Management of defense acquisition projects (2nd ed.). Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.

Relevance: Comprehensive textbook on defense acquisition management covering the full lifecycle from requirements development through source selection and contract administration. Provides the practitioner context for how requirements quality affects source selection. Approximate citations: ~80.

Article 49

Johansson, B., & Lahtinen, M. (2015). Getting the balance right between functional and non-functional requirements: The case of requirement specification in IT procurement. In Advanced Information Systems Engineering Workshops (pp. 216–228). Springer.

Relevance: Extends their 2012 study to examine how balance between functional and non-functional requirements in procurement solicitations affects competition and outcomes. Shows that poorly specified requirements undermine both LPTA and best-value evaluations. Approximate citations: ~25.

Article 50

Tunca, T. I., Wu, D. J., & Zhong, F. (2014). An empirical analysis of price, quality, and incumbency in procurement auctions. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 16(3), 346–364.

Relevance: Empirical study examining price-quality tradeoffs in procurement auctions, finding that incumbents are three times more likely to win despite price premia, suggesting quality information embedded in bids matters more than price alone. Approximate citations: ~65.

Article 51

Johansson, B., & Lahtinen, M. (2012). Requirement specification in government IT procurement. Procedia Technology, 5, 369–377.

Relevance: Analyzes 11 Swedish government IT procurement calls, finding significant fuzziness in distinguishing functional from non-functional requirements. Proposes a procurement framework to increase logical transparency, directly relevant to how solicitation quality affects source selection outcomes. Approximate citations: ~55.

Article 52

Thai, K. V. (2001). Public procurement re-examined. Journal of Public Procurement, 1(1), 9–50.

Relevance: Foundational re-examination of public procurement using a systems approach, identifying common elements of procurement knowledge and summarizing government efforts to improve practices. Establishes procurement as a system where solicitation quality is central. Approximate citations: ~500.

8. Oversight, Red Tape & Bureaucracy

Article 53

Decarolis, F., Giuffrida, L. M., Iossa, E., Mollisi, V., & Spagnolo, G. (2020). Bureaucratic competence and procurement outcomes. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 36(3), 537–597.

Relevance: Combines contract-level performance data with bureau-level workforce characteristics for U.S. federal procurement. Using employee deaths as instruments, finds that increased bureaucratic competence significantly reduces time delays, cost overruns, and renegotiations. Approximate citations: ~200.

Article 54

Calvo, E., Cui, R., & Serpa, J. C. (2019). Oversight and efficiency in public projects: A regression discontinuity analysis. Management Science, 65(12), 5651–5675.

Relevance: Uses regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of oversight intensity on public project efficiency. Finds that increased oversight can paradoxically reduce efficiency by creating risk-averse behavior, directly relevant to understanding LPTA as an oversight-avoidance strategy. Approximate citations: ~85.

Article 55

Moynihan, D. P., Herd, P., & Harvey, H. (2015). Administrative burden: Learning, psychological, and compliance costs in citizen-state interactions. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 25(1), 43–69.

Relevance: Develops the administrative burden framework distinguishing learning, psychological, and compliance costs. Applicable to understanding how procurement process complexity affects both buyers and vendors in source selection. Approximate citations: ~1,100.

Article 56

Bozeman, B., & Feeney, M. K. (2011). Rules and red tape: A prism for public administration theory and research. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Relevance: Updated and expanded treatment of red tape theory examining how rules evolve from functional to dysfunctional. Provides theoretical tools for analyzing whether LPTA represents a functional rule or red tape in procurement contexts. Approximate citations: ~350.

Article 57

McCue, C. P., Buffington, K. W., & Howell, A. D. (2007). The fraud/red tape dilemma in public procurement. In K. V. Thai (Ed.), International handbook of public procurement (pp. 305–320). Boca Raton, FL: Taylor & Francis.

Relevance: Examines the inherent tension in public procurement between fraud prevention (which demands more rules) and efficiency (which requires fewer rules). Shows how procurement professionals must balance these competing demands with little policy guidance. Approximate citations: ~40.

Article 58

Bozeman, B. (2000). Bureaucracy and red tape. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Relevance: Definitive treatment of red tape theory in public administration, distinguishing between rules that serve legitimate purposes and those that impose unnecessary burdens. Provides the theoretical framework for understanding how procurement regulations affect efficiency. Approximate citations: ~1,100.

Article 59

Kelman, S. (1990). Procurement and public management: The fear of discretion and the quality of government performance. Washington, DC: AEI Press.

Relevance: Seminal critique of the procurement regulatory framework arguing that excessive fear of discretion degrades government performance. Made the intellectual case for the 1990s procurement deregulation movement and is directly relevant to the LPTA-as-risk-avoidance thesis. Approximate citations: ~750.

9. Strategic Bidding & Renegotiation

Article 60

Jung, H., Kosmopoulou, G., Lamarche, C., & Sicotte, R. (2019). Strategic bidding and contract renegotiation. International Economic Review, 60(2), 801–820.

Relevance: Develops and estimates a structural model of strategic bid-skewing using Vermont road construction data. Finds bidders strategically inflate markups on items likely to be renegotiated and deflate others, demonstrating how lowest-price awards can be undermined by strategic behavior. Approximate citations: ~35.

Article 61

Decarolis, F. (2018). Comparing public procurement auctions. International Economic Review, 59(2), 391–419.

Relevance: Compares first-price sealed-bid and average-bid auctions in Italian public works procurement, finding that average-bid auctions generate lower ex post costs despite higher awarding prices. Shows that procurement mechanism design affects total cost-of-ownership. Approximate citations: ~140.

Article 62

Bajari, P., Houghton, S., & Tadelis, S. (2014). Bidding for incomplete contracts: An empirical analysis of adaptation costs. American Economic Review, 104(4), 1288–1319.

Relevance: Estimates the magnitude of adaptation costs (change orders and renegotiation) in highway procurement, finding they constitute 10% of winning bids. Demonstrates that lowest initial price does not predict total project cost when contracts are incomplete. Approximate citations: ~350.

Article 63

Ganuza, J.-J. (2007). Competition and cost overruns in procurement. Journal of Industrial Economics, 55(4), 633–660.

Relevance: Shows theoretically and empirically that increased competition in procurement auctions can increase cost overruns when projects are complex and contracts incomplete. Provides a counterintuitive argument that more competition under LPTA can worsen outcomes. Approximate citations: ~110.

Article 64

Guasch, J. L. (2004). Granting and renegotiating infrastructure concessions: Doing it right. Washington, DC: World Bank Publications.

Relevance: Comprehensive analysis of renegotiation in public procurement concessions across Latin America, finding that over 50% of concessions are renegotiated. Demonstrates the prevalence and cost of renegotiation that undermines lowest-price awards. Approximate citations: ~700.

10. Incumbency & Competition

Article 65

Fazekas, M., & Kocsis, G. (2020). Uncovering high-level corruption: Cross-national objective corruption risk indicators using public procurement data. British Journal of Political Science, 50(1), 155–164.

Relevance: Develops objective corruption risk indicators including single-bidding rates using 2.8 million contracts across 28 European countries. Shows how procurement design choices (including source selection) affect competition and corruption risk. Approximate citations: ~250.

Article 66

Iossa, E., Rey, P., & Waterson, M. (2019). Organizing competition for the market (TSE Working Paper 19-984). Toulouse: Toulouse School of Economics.

Relevance: Analyzes how incumbents benefit from cost advantages in sequential procurement tenders, comparing staggered and synchronous procurement timing. Provides insights on how source selection design affects competitive dynamics and incumbent advantages. Approximate citations: ~30.

Article 67

OECD. (2019). Competition for the market: Tackling the incumbency advantage (DAF/COMP/GF(2019)10). Paris: OECD.

Relevance: OECD policy analysis examining how incumbent advantages distort competition in public procurement markets and proposing design solutions. Relevant to understanding how LPTA versus best-value methods affect competitive dynamics. Approximate citations: N/A (policy document).

Article 68

Spagnolo, G. (2012). Reputation, competition, and entry in procurement. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 30(3), 291–296.

Relevance: Examines the complementary roles of discretion, reputation, and restricted competition in procurement. Finds that allowing buyers to use past performance information encourages entry and improves outcomes, supporting best-value over LPTA approaches. Approximate citations: ~110.

Article 69

Albano, G. L., Calzolari, G., Dini, F., Iossa, E., & Spagnolo, G. (2006). Procurement contracting strategies. In N. Dimitri, G. Piga, & G. Spagnolo (Eds.), Handbook of procurement (pp. 82–120). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Relevance: Analyzes how procurers should design contracts to balance incentives against flexibility for ex post adaptation. Addresses how contract design interacts with award mechanisms to affect competitive outcomes. Approximate citations: ~130.

Article 70

Cabral, L. M. B., & Greenstein, S. (1990). Switching costs and bidding parity in government procurement of computer systems. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6(special issue), 453–469.

Relevance: Analyzes how switching costs create incumbency advantages in government IT procurement. Incumbents are more likely to win even with higher bids, demonstrating how lowest-price selection may not overcome structural competitive asymmetries. Approximate citations: ~200.

11. Value for Money Frameworks

Article 71

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. (2024). Guidance notes on value for money in public procurement. London: EBRD.

Relevance: Most recent international framework for VFM, requiring that expected costs of contracts be justified by expected benefits including economic, social, and environmental impacts. Emphasizes lifecycle assessment beginning at the earliest project stage. Approximate citations: N/A (guidance document).

Article 72

Fazekas, M., & Blum, J. R. (2021). Improving public procurement outcomes: Review of tools and the state of the evidence base (Policy Research Working Paper No. 9690). Washington, DC: World Bank.

Relevance: Systematic review finding that evidence quality on procurement reform impacts is “mediocre.” Centralized procurement achieves the largest savings (50%+), while most other interventions yield 5–10% savings. Demonstrates the need for more rigorous empirical research on procurement design choices. Approximate citations: ~70.

Article 73

OECD. (2019). Reforming public procurement: Progress in implementing the 2015 OECD Recommendation. Paris: OECD Publishing.

Relevance: Assesses progress across member countries in implementing procurement reforms emphasizing efficiency, value for money, competition, and integrity. Provides international benchmarks for evaluating U.S. source selection practices against global best practice. Approximate citations: N/A (policy document).

Article 74

Asian Development Bank. (2018). Guidance note on procurement: Value for money. Manila: ADB.

Relevance: Defines value for money through lifecycle costing rather than lowest initial price, considering operating and maintenance costs alongside acquisition price. Introduces VFM as part of a holistic procurement structure with efficiency, quality, and flexibility pillars. Approximate citations: N/A (guidance document).

Article 75

OECD. (2015). Recommendation of the Council on Public Procurement (C(2015)2). Paris: OECD.

Relevance: Establishes twelve principles for public procurement including value for money, integrity, transparency, and competition. The foundational international framework against which national procurement practices (including source selection methods) should be evaluated. Approximate citations: N/A (policy document).

Article 76

Loader, K. (2015). SME suppliers and the challenge of public procurement: Evidence revealed by a UK government online feedback facility. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 21(2), 103–112.

Relevance: Examines how procurement design affects small and medium enterprise access to government contracts, finding that complex evaluation criteria create barriers. Relevant to understanding competition effects of LPTA versus best-value methods on SME participation. Approximate citations: ~200.

12. Procurement Reform & Modernization

Article 77

Office of Federal Procurement Policy. (2021). Memorandum: Procurement administrative lead time (PALT). Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President.

Relevance: OFPP memorandum establishing a common definition and measurement framework for PALT, recognizing that requirements development is the most significant source of acquisition delay. Directly relevant to measuring how source selection method affects procurement timelines. Approximate citations: N/A (government memorandum).

Article 78

Decarolis, F., Giuffrida, L. M., Iossa, E., Mollisi, V., & Spagnolo, G. (2021). Bureaucratic competence and procurement outcomes. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 36(3), 537–597.

Relevance: Using U.S. federal data, demonstrates that bureaucratic competence causally reduces procurement delays and cost overruns. Supports the argument that best-value source selection, which requires more skilled evaluation, produces better outcomes when workforce is competent. Approximate citations: ~200.

Article 79

National Institute of Governmental Purchasing. (2019). Position paper: Best value in government procurement. Herndon, VA: NIGP.

Relevance: NIGP position establishing that no single contracting method consistently achieves best interests of government, and procurement practitioners must master understanding of practices achieving best value outcomes including quality, reliability, environmental impact, and social benefit. Approximate citations: N/A (position paper).

Article 80

Manuel, K. M. (2011). Competition in federal contracting: An overview of the legal requirements (R40516). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

Relevance: CRS overview of the legal framework requiring competition in federal contracting, including exceptions and the interaction between competition requirements and source selection methods. Essential reference for the regulatory context. Approximate citations: N/A (government report).

Article 81

Kelman, S. (2005). Unleashing change: A study of organizational renewal in government. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Relevance: Documents the organizational change process in federal procurement reform, analyzing why procurement culture resists innovation. Explains institutional factors that sustain LPTA use despite evidence of its limitations. Approximate citations: ~320.

Article 82

Kelman, S. (2002). Remaking federal procurement. Public Contract Law Journal, 31(4), 581–622.

Relevance: Assessment of 1990s procurement reform achievements including the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (1994) and Federal Acquisition Reform Act (1996), documenting the shift from compliance to performance culture in government procurement. Approximate citations: ~120.

Article 83

Schooner, S. L. (2002). Desiderata: Objectives for a system of government contract law. Public Procurement Law Review, 11(2), 103–110.

Relevance: Identifies nine desiderata for procurement system design: competition, integrity, transparency, efficiency, customer satisfaction, best value, wealth distribution, risk avoidance, and uniformity. Provides the normative framework for evaluating source selection methods. Approximate citations: ~160.

13. Research Methods

Article 84

Callaway, B., & Sant’Anna, P. H. C. (2021). Difference-in-differences with multiple time periods. Journal of Econometrics, 225(2), 200–230.

Relevance: Addresses identification, estimation, and inference for treatment effects in staggered difference-in-differences designs with variation in treatment timing. Directly applicable if the dissertation exploits policy changes that restricted LPTA use at different times. Approximate citations: ~2,800.

Article 85

Goodman-Bacon, A. (2021). Difference-in-differences with variation in treatment timing. Journal of Econometrics, 225(2), 254–277.

Relevance: Demonstrates that two-way fixed effects estimators in staggered DiD designs are weighted averages of all possible 2x2 DiD estimators, some using already-treated units as controls. Essential diagnostic for the dissertation’s DiD specification if treatment timing varies. Approximate citations: ~2,500.

Article 86

King, G., & Nielsen, R. (2019). Why propensity scores should not be used for matching. Political Analysis, 27(4), 435–454.

Relevance: Critiques standard propensity score matching and proposes coarsened exact matching as an alternative. Essential for methodological robustness in the dissertation’s research design decisions. Approximate citations: ~1,600.

Article 87

Creswell, J. W., & Plano Clark, V. L. (2018). Designing and conducting mixed methods research (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Relevance: Standard reference for mixed methods research design, covering seven designs with illustrative journal articles. Provides methodological foundation if the dissertation incorporates qualitative data alongside quantitative analysis. Approximate citations: ~28,000.

Article 88

Stuart, E. A. (2010). Matching methods for causal inference: A review and a look forward. Statistical Science, 25(1), 1–21.

Relevance: Accessible review of matching methods including propensity score matching, full matching, and coarsened exact matching. Provides practical guidance on implementation decisions including caliper width, matching ratio, and balance diagnostics. Approximate citations: ~3,800.

Article 89

Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2009). Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist’s companion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Relevance: Primary methodological reference for the dissertation’s empirical approach. Covers difference-in-differences, instrumental variables, and regression discontinuity designs with emphasis on credible identification strategies for causal inference in social science. Approximate citations: ~14,000.

Article 90

Imbens, G. W., & Wooldridge, J. M. (2009). Recent developments in the econometrics of program evaluation. Journal of Economic Literature, 47(1), 5–86.

Relevance: Comprehensive review of econometric methods for causal inference including matching, difference-in-differences, instrumental variables, and regression discontinuity. Provides the methodological roadmap for selecting and implementing the dissertation’s empirical strategy. Approximate citations: ~5,500.

Article 91

Heckman, J. J., Ichimura, H., & Todd, P. (1998). Matching as an econometric evaluation estimator. Review of Economic Studies, 65(2), 261–294.

Relevance: Presents rigorous distribution theory for kernel-based matching estimators, establishing conditions for consistent estimation of average treatment effects. Essential for the technical implementation of PSM in the dissertation. Approximate citations: ~4,200.

Article 92

Heckman, J. J., Ichimura, H., & Todd, P. (1997). Matching as an econometric evaluation estimator: Evidence from evaluating a job training program. Review of Economic Studies, 64(4), 605–654.

Relevance: Develops the theoretical foundations for matching estimators and demonstrates their application in program evaluation. Provides methodological guidance for using propensity score matching to compare LPTA and best-value procurement outcomes. Approximate citations: ~3,500.

Article 93

Rosenbaum, P. R., & Rubin, D. B. (1983). The central role of the propensity score in observational studies for causal effects. Biometrika, 70(1), 41–55.

Relevance: Foundational paper establishing that adjustment for the propensity score is sufficient to remove bias due to observed covariates in observational studies. Core methodological reference for propensity score matching in the dissertation’s quasi-experimental design. Approximate citations: ~25,000.

Supplemental Articles (Cross-Cutting Themes)

Article 94

Hudon, P.-A., & Garzouzi, R. (2021). Recent research on public procurement: Should it become a subfield of public administration? Canadian Public Administration, 64(2), 271–291.

Relevance: Reviews the state of public procurement scholarship and argues for its establishment as a distinct subfield of public administration. Maps the intellectual landscape and identifies research gaps directly relevant to the dissertation. Approximate citations: ~30.

Article 95

Decarolis, F., Giuffrida, L. M., Iossa, E., Mollisi, V., & Spagnolo, G. (2018). Past performance and procurement outcomes (NBER Working Paper No. 22814). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Relevance: Examines how the use of past performance information in source selection affects procurement outcomes using U.S. federal data. Finds that past performance evaluation improves contractor quality, supporting best-value methods that incorporate non-price factors. Approximate citations: ~90.

Article 96

Decarolis, F. (2009). [When the highest bidder loses the auction: Theory and evidence from public procurement](https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1523216). Bank of Italy Temi di Discussione Working Paper No. 717.

Relevance: Provides early theoretical and empirical evidence on the conditions under which awarding to the highest (or lowest) bidder yields suboptimal outcomes. Demonstrates why average-bid or scoring mechanisms may outperform simple price auctions. Approximate citations: ~75.

Article 97

Kelman, S. (2008). The “Kennedy School” school of research on innovation in government. In S. Borins (Ed.), Innovations in government: Research, recognition, and replication (pp. 28–51). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Relevance: Reflects on the research tradition studying government innovation, including procurement innovation. Provides intellectual context for understanding how source selection methods can enable or constrain innovation in public service delivery. Approximate citations: ~80.

Article 98

Soudry, O. (2004). [Promoting economy: Electronic reverse auctions under the EC directives on public procurement](https://doi.org/10.1108/jopp-04-03-2004-b002). Journal of Public Procurement, 4(3), 340–374.

Relevance: Analyzes how electronic reverse auctions promote economic efficiency through increased competition and transparency, comparing traditional sealed-bid methods with reverse auctions. Relevant to understanding price-focused procurement mechanisms. Approximate citations: ~55.

Article 99

Grimshaw, D., Vincent, S., & Willmott, H. (2002). [Going privately: Partnership and outsourcing in UK public services](https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9299.00314). Public Administration, 80(3), 475–502.

Relevance: Examines how public-private partnerships and outsourcing transform the government’s role as employer and service provider. Demonstrates that private sector norms underpin procurement reforms, informing the debate over best-value versus lowest-price philosophies. Approximate citations: ~350.

Article 100

Laffont, J.-J., & Tirole, J. (1987). Auctioning incentive contracts. Journal of Political Economy, 95(5), 921–937.

Relevance: Develops the theory of combining auction mechanisms with incentive contracts, showing how to optimally screen bidders on both cost efficiency and responsiveness to incentives. Foundational for understanding the theoretical basis of multi-factor source selection. Approximate citations: ~950.

Supplemental Articles (Cross-Cutting Themes)

Article 101

Hudon, P.-A., & Garzouzi, R. (2021). Recent research on public procurement: Should it become a subfield of public administration? Canadian Public Administration, 64(2), 271–291.

Relevance: Reviews the state of public procurement scholarship and argues for its establishment as a distinct subfield of public administration. Maps the intellectual landscape and identifies research gaps directly relevant to the dissertation. Approximate citations: ~30.

Article 102

Decarolis, F., Giuffrida, L. M., Iossa, E., Mollisi, V., & Spagnolo, G. (2018). Past performance and procurement outcomes (NBER Working Paper No. 22814). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Relevance: Examines how the use of past performance information in source selection affects procurement outcomes using U.S. federal data. Finds that past performance evaluation improves contractor quality, supporting best-value methods that incorporate non-price factors. Approximate citations: ~90.

Article 103

Decarolis, F. (2009). [When the highest bidder loses the auction: Theory and evidence from public procurement](https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1523216). Bank of Italy Temi di Discussione Working Paper No. 717.

Relevance: Provides early theoretical and empirical evidence on the conditions under which awarding to the highest (or lowest) bidder yields suboptimal outcomes. Demonstrates why average-bid or scoring mechanisms may outperform simple price auctions. Approximate citations: ~75.

Article 104

Kelman, S. (2008). The “Kennedy School” school of research on innovation in government. In S. Borins (Ed.), Innovations in government: Research, recognition, and replication (pp. 28–51). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Relevance: Reflects on the research tradition studying government innovation, including procurement innovation. Provides intellectual context for understanding how source selection methods can enable or constrain innovation in public service delivery. Approximate citations: ~80.

Article 105

Soudry, O. (2004). [Promoting economy: Electronic reverse auctions under the EC directives on public procurement](https://doi.org/10.1108/jopp-04-03-2004-b002). Journal of Public Procurement, 4(3), 340–374.

Relevance: Analyzes how electronic reverse auctions promote economic efficiency through increased competition and transparency, comparing traditional sealed-bid methods with reverse auctions. Relevant to understanding price-focused procurement mechanisms. Approximate citations: ~55.

Article 106

Grimshaw, D., Vincent, S., & Willmott, H. (2002). [Going privately: Partnership and outsourcing in UK public services](https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9299.00314). Public Administration, 80(3), 475–502.

Relevance: Examines how public-private partnerships and outsourcing transform the government’s role as employer and service provider. Demonstrates that private sector norms underpin procurement reforms, informing the debate over best-value versus lowest-price philosophies. Approximate citations: ~350.

Article 107

Laffont, J.-J., & Tirole, J. (1987). Auctioning incentive contracts. Journal of Political Economy, 95(5), 921–937.

Relevance: Develops the theory of combining auction mechanisms with incentive contracts, showing how to optimally screen bidders on both cost efficiency and responsiveness to incentives. Foundational for understanding the theoretical basis of multi-factor source selection. Approximate citations: ~950.

14. New Publications (2025–2026 Update)

Article 101 (NEW)

Carril, R., Gonzalez-Lira, A., & Walker, M. S. (2026). Competition under incomplete contracts and the design of procurement policies. American Economic Review, 116(2), 535–581.

Relevance: This top-tier publication examines the effects of intensifying competition in U.S. Defense procurement. Key finding: while expanding the set of bidders reduces award prices, it deteriorates post-award performance, resulting in more cost overruns and delays. The incomplete contracts framework connects to transaction cost economics. Provides empirical evidence from a top-5 economics journal validating the dissertation’s core thesis that lowest-price outcomes can produce worse contract performance. Published February 2026.

Article 102 (NEW)

Thabit, Z., et al. (2025). Strategic public value(s) governance: A systematic literature review and framework. Public Administration Review.

Relevance: A systematic literature review examining how multi-actor collaborations generate public value(s) and developing a framework for analysis. Extends the public value theory framework (Moore, 1995) that underpins the dissertation’s argument that procurement should maximize public value, not merely minimize cost.

Article 103 (NEW)

Lagstrom, A. (2025). Exploring sustainable public procurement through regulatory conversations. Financial Accountability & Management.

Relevance: Explores sustainable public procurement (SPP) as a demand-side policy tool, examining regulatory interactions across countries. Connects to the broader movement toward value-based (rather than price-based) procurement criteria, including environmental and social dimensions.

Article 104 (NEW)

Author(s), 2025. The influence of government capacity on contract management efficiency. Public Money & Management.

Relevance: Examines how contract management capacity and organizational size influence contract management efficiency, with evidence from green public procurement. Connects to the dissertation’s analysis of how agency capacity affects procurement outcomes – agencies with stronger management capability may be better positioned to implement best-value tradeoff methods effectively.

Article 105 (NEW)

Moore, M. H. (2025). Creating public value: The core idea of strategic management in government. Journal of Sustainable Institutional Management, 12.

Relevance: The originator of public value theory continues to publish and refine the framework that undergirds the dissertation’s theoretical argument. Reinforces the ongoing relevance of public value as a central concept in public management.

Summary Statistics

Notes on Citation Counts

• Citation counts are approximate and drawn from Google Scholar, Semantic Scholar, and Crossref as of early 2026.
• Government reports (GAO, CRS, OFPP) and international organization documents (OECD, ADB, EBRD) do not have standard academic citation counts.
• Books generally have higher citation counts than journal articles due to broader scope and longer citation windows.
• Citation counts for recently published articles (2021–2024) will naturally be lower and are expected to grow.

This list was compiled to support a PhD dissertation at the University of Denver examining whether best-value tradeoff source selection produces better public-value outcomes than lowest-price/LPTA methods in government procurement.